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Summary / Zusammenfassung
Relations between the EU and Russia have been stagnating for many years. Expec-
tations on both sides differ greatly, and their non-fulfillment compounds mutual 
frustration. The EU needs a more realistic assessment of  the current situation in 
Russia, one that is not based on hopes, unrealistic expectations, and stereotypes. 
The right approach lies neither in focusing entirely on human right issues nor in 
only doing business with Russia. Rather, the EU should concentrate on setting the 
rules, even if  this comes at a cost in the short run. The analysis of  three key areas 
in the relations—energy, neighborhood, and visa policy—shows the degree to 
which the assessments of  relations differ. It also underlines how security concerns 
still influence policy. The conclusion is that even if  Russia is a difficult partner—
especially now, as it blocks nearly every cooperation initiative—the EU can and 
must do more. First of  all, the EU should not accept Russian rules for the rela-
tionship but set and enforce its own rules. Secondly, the EU should use and apply 
existing instruments in a less ideological, but more pragmatic way. Finally, rather 
than give priority to stabilizing the ruling elite, Brussels should refocus its policy 
on potential partners within the elite and society at large.
EU-Russland Beziehungen und die 
gemeinsame Nachbarschaft: Die EU ist 
am Zug
Die Beziehungen zwischen der EU und Russland stagnieren seit Jahren. Die 
Erwartungen zum Beispiel in Bezug auf  die Modernisierungspartnerschaft sind 
sehr unterschiedlich, deren Nichterfüllung führt zu wachsender Frustration auf  
beiden Seiten. Die EU braucht eine realistische Einschätzung über die aktuelle 
Situation in Russland, die nicht auf  Hoffnungen, unrealistischen Erwartungen oder 
Stereotypen basiert. Der richtige Ansatz ist weder eine einseitige Fokussierung auf  
Menschenrechtsfragen noch auf  wirtschaftliche Beziehungen. Vielmehr sollte die 
EU sich auf  das Durchsetzen von Rechtsprinzipien konzentrieren, auch wenn das 
kurzfristig Nachteile mit sich bringt. Diese Analyse von den drei Schlüsselbereichen 
in den EU-Russland-Beziehungen, Energie-, Nachbarschafts- und Visapolitik, zeigt 
das Ausmaß der unterschiedlichen Einschätzung der Beziehungen. Als Ergebnis 
wird deutlich: Auch wenn Russland ein schwieriger Partner ist, so kann und sollte 
die EU mehr tun. Erstens sollte sie keine russischen Regeln für die Beziehungen 
akzeptieren, sondern ihre eigenen Prinzipien konsequenter durchsetzen. Zweitens 
sollte die EU die vorhandenen Instrumente auf  eine weniger ideologische, sondern 
pragmatischere Art und Weise nutzen und umsetzen. Drittens, anstatt sich auf  die 
Stabilisierung der herrschenden Elite zu konzentrieren, sollte Brüssel seine Politik 
auf  andere potenzielle Partner in der Elite und Gesellschaft ausrichten.
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Introduction
EU-Russia relations can be described as stagnating. 
Both sides have been negotiating a new partnership 
and cooperation agreement since 2008—without 
results—, and the four common spaces have never 
become fundamentally relevant for the relations. 
EU member states are frustrated by Russia’s lim-
ited political and institutional modernization and 
democratization (Russia fatigue). In Russian dis-
course, meanwhile, the EU is seen as mired in such 
deep institutional crisis that it no longer serves 
as a viable model for Russia’s modernization (EU 
fatigue). The Russian government’s new official 
focus is no longer Europe but Asia and Eurasia. 
With Vladimir Putin’s third presidential term, the 
Russian elite has to deal increasingly with domestic 
uncertainties and to concentrate its foreign policy 
on managing its Eurasian neighborhood—and 
balancing China. The result is more isolation from 
the EU and, for the time being, the end of  Russia’s 
gradual Europeanization.1
Perception and stereotypes play a key role in EU-
Russia relations. Expectations on both sides differ 
greatly, and their non-fulfillment leads to frustra-
tion. EU-Russia summits are mere simulations 
of  relevance; if  decisions are made, they do not 
occur in the context of  such summits but rather 
only with the involvement of  individual member 
states.2 Taking the modernization partnership as an 
example, the EU’s aim is “to help modernize Rus-
sia’s economy” and to induce Russia to adopt EU’s 
norms and standards as a guideline.
The current Russian regime, however, never 
had the goal of  accepting the EU’s norms and 
principles; instead, it wants to set its own norms, 
which are at the same time still uncertain. Russia’s 
(national) interests still lack a clear definition.3 At 
present, the Russian leadership’s main interest is 
technological—the transfer of  know-how—which 
will help stabilize the existing political and eco-
nomic regime, but not political modernization.
The EU needs a more realistic assessment of  the 
current situation in Russia, one that is not based 
exclusively on hopes, unrealistic expectations, and 
stereotypes. The right approach lies neither in 
focusing entirely on human right issues—and culti-
vating a confrontational relationship with the coun-
try—nor in only doing business with Russia. Trade 
between Europe and Russia is growing, especially 
for the German economy,4 but Russia’s lack of  rule 
of  law and transparency, the prevalence of  cor-
ruption, and the dominance of  the state continue 
to shape its political landscape. The EU’s current 
policy actually reinforces these negative aspects; it 
is driven more by securitization and politicization 
than by a focus on normative practice and good 
governance.5 There are areas where limited cooper-
ation is possible, but the questions are: under which 
conditions? Who sets the rules? 
An analysis of  three examples—energy relations, 
neighborhood policy, and visa policy—highlights 
the degree to which the assessments of  relations 
differ and how strongly security concerns influ-
ence policy on both sides. As long as EU member 
states view Russia more as a threat than as a chal-
lenge, neither side will be able to move away from 
stagnating relations. Although Russia is not seen 
as a real threat in a traditional way, it and its policy 
are still securitized which is part of  the problem 
for the EU’s Russia policy itself. This view serves 
also the interest of  the Russian elite, which wants 
to see their country as important as possible. Rus-
sia is not a static country; its society and partly its 
elite are undergoing tremendous change—a fact 
that challenges the regime itself. Russian leadership 
understands the language of  interests and strength 
but has yet to grasp the language of  compromise. 
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The EU has more leeway on Russia than it believes, 
but Brussels and the individual member states must 
understand how the mechanisms work and how to 
set a better framework for relations.
The following chapters analyze different percep-
tions of  energy policy, the common neighborhood, 
and visa policy. These three areas are key for EU-
Russia relations and, potentially, for cooperation. At 
the same time, however, they often lead to conflicts. 
The main question is how the EU can engage Rus-
sia without accepting Russian rules. This paper’s 
main thesis is that the EU, by securitizing and 
politicizing certain policy areas (such as energy, 
neighborhood policy, and visa policy), is contradict-
ing its normative agenda, which has considerably 
weakened the EU’s Eastern Neighborhood and 
Russia policy. Setting and implementing norms and 
rules rather than politicizing and securitizing rela-
tions would be a far more fruitful course of  action.
Energy Relations
Energy relations are a main area of  cooperation 
between Russia and the EU. Russia is the most 
important supplier of  oil, gas, and coal to the 
EU, and the EU member states are Moscow’s 
most important trade partners and customers 
for resources. In 2010, 34.5 percent of  crude oil 
imports to the EU were from Russia. The import 
of  hard coal grew from 13.1 percent in 2002 to 
27.1 percent in 2010, while that of  natural gas 
declined from 45.1 percent to 31.8 percent between 
2003 and 2010.6
The “threat” of  high European dependency on 
Russian energy comes not from the amount of  
resources imported from Russia, but from the fact 
that some member states receive 100 percent of  
their gas from Gazprom and lack alternatives, giv-
ing Gazprom a monopoly on supply. This is espe-
cially the case with some eastern member states like 
Bulgaria, the Baltic States, and Romania, for whom 
gas plays an important role in the energy mix.7 This 
problematic dependency resulted in the Russian-
Ukrainian gas crisis of  winter 2008/09, leading to 
an interruption of  supply that fundamentally chal-
lenged some countries’ energy and heating abilities.
While energy was for a long time primarily under-
stood as an area of  cooperation in EU-Russia rela-
tions, it has increasingly become an area of  conflict. 
This came about with the accession to the EU 
in 2004 of  the Baltic States and the post-socialist 
countries—nearly all countries with a special his-
toric relationship to Russia and comprehensive 
gas dependency on it. Other factors have affected 
EU-Russia energy relations as well: the EU’s Third 
Energy Package, adopted in 2009, which under-
mines Gazprom’s business model; the inflexibility 
of  Gazprom in a changing global gas market; and 
the securitization of  energy on both sides. The 
EU’s energy policy in particular has led to harsh 
criticism from Gazprom and the Russian govern-
ment because it aims to unbundle energy and gas 
distribution from production.8 Gazprom tried to 
undermine the European Commission’s policy, lob-
bying against the Third Energy Package through 
its partner companies in the EU. The main goal 
of  the Commission is to foster more competition 
in the EU energy market, which undermines Gaz-
prom’s pipeline and long-term contract policy.
Energy dependence on Russia is criticized in the 
public and political discourses of  many EU coun-
tries. It is argued that the Kremlin uses energy as a 
weapon against its Western neighbors. “In Soviet 
times, it was tanks and rockets, today the source of  
Russian great power policy is oil and gas,” is one 
example of  this line of  argument.9 The discussion 
is influenced by security experts but often lacks 
comprehensive economic analysis.10 Gazprom 
is described as an instrument of  the Kremlin to 
increase Russia’s influence, and the monopoly of  
Russian gas is seen as enforcing political and eco-
nomic interests. It is pointed out that EU member 
states have limited alternatives and depend too 
much on Russian gas. Russia’s perceived goal is to 
turn itself  into an energy super power. As Martin 
Schulz, president of  the European Parliament, told 
Deutschland funk, “Gas—Putin always used this 
company [Gazprom] as a kind of  a weapon, as a 
kind of  a gas weapon.”11 In response, the EU is 
urged to build alternative pipelines; Nabucco or 
TAP (Trans-Adriatic-Pipeline) in the framework 
of  the Southern gas corridor are cited as examples 
of  the so called necessary diversification of  energy 
import routes. Günther Oettinger, the EU commis-
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sioner for energy, has in several statements under-
lined the EU’s need to diversify its energy supply 
and reduce its dependency on Russia.12 The argu-
ment of  a “gas war” between Russia and the EU, 
however, is based on a one-sided selection of  facts 
and arguments. In short, the dominant discourse 
simply securitizes the issue, while ignoring other 
facts.
The reality of  EU-Russia energy relations is more 
complex. Rather than being a matter of  one-sided 
dependency, relations are characterized by interde-
pendence. Europe is responsible for approximately 
60 percent of  Gazprom exports, followed by the 
Commonwealth of  Independent States (CIS), 
which have less than 30 percent, and Turkey, with 
less than 10 percent.13 Yet, both the markets in the 
EU (Gazprom’s biggest export market) and in the 
post-Soviet states (especially Ukraine) are either 
stagnating or decreasing. The CIS countries in par-
ticular are expected to need less gas in the future, 
due to economic stagnation and the huge potential 
to save energy. The International Energy Agency 
challenges the expectations of  a massive increase in 
gas demand in Europe, arguing that the economic 
crisis and the increasing amount of  renewable 
energy in the EU will lead to a rather stagnating 
market.14 That means Gazprom has a diversifica-
tion problem. In 2012, two thirds of  its earnings 
came from EU member states, Turkey, and CIS 
countries, with the Russian market accounting for 
only one third of  earnings. In the same year, how-
ever, it sold more than 55 percent to the Russian 
market and only 45 percent abroad.15 Russia’s focus 
on the European market is because of  the existing 
pipeline infrastructure, which is the core of  Russian 
energy policy. The company has started to invest 
too late in infrastructure for the Asian, and espe-
cially the Chinese, market—currently the fastest-
growing markets. Because gas prices remain low on 
the regulated domestic market, however, Gazprom 
(as the export monopolist) makes most of  its profit 
abroad. In 2011, the average domestic gas price 
was 63.5 Euro per bcm (without tax and customs 
duties) compared with 213.9 bcm in Europe.16 On 
the domestic market Gazprom competes increas-
ingly with independent gas companies like Novatek, 
which has a more flexible price policy, but also with 
Rosneft, which invests in the gas market.
The Russian government has failed to diversify its 
economy; its budget is one-sided and dependent on 
the export of  resources, especially oil. At present 
it needs an oil price of  around 120 dollars per bar-
rel to have a balanced budget.17 At the same time 
the global gas market has changed fundamentally 
with the rise of  liquefied natural gas (LNG) and 
shale gas. Pipeline gas, the main means of  export-
ing Russian gas, with long-term contracts and fixed 
amounts of  gas, is partly being replaced on the 
stock market by cheaper gas, which is exported 
as LNG by tanker. Gazprom’s role in the LNG 
market is very limited. With Sachalin 2, there is 
only one LNG terminal in Russia, which supplies 
the Asian market; several others are planned.18 By 
sleeping through these developments, Gazprom 
lost share in the European market. Thanks to 
flexible contracts and lower prices, the share of  
gas from Qatar on the EU market rose from less 
than 1 percent in 2003 to 8.6 percent in 2010.19 
Meanwhile, gas imports to the US have decreased 
as a result of  the increasing domestic extraction of  
shale gas, and there is a shrinking demand on the 
world market for gas due to the global financial 
crisis after 2008. LNG has become cheaper than 
Russian pipeline gas. Finally, conflicts over price 
between Gazprom and European gas companies 
often lead to decreasing prices for the Russian 
company.20
Rethink Conflicts between Gazprom and 
European Energy Companies
The several conflicts that have taken place between 
Gazprom and its partners in the past can better 
be explained in terms of  economic interests than 
by a one-sided focus on power policy interests. 
Gazprom did not always prevail in these conflicts, 
which shows that it has to balance its own goals 
with the political interest of  the Russian state and 
the interests of  its business partners. Turkish state-
owned oil and gas company Botas, for example, 
diminished the contracted quantity of  gas after 
completion of  the Blue-Stream Pipeline through 
the Black Sea in 2003 and was able to beat down 
the price because of  its economic interests and 
negotiation power. In light of  the interruption 
of  gas supply that took place during the Ukraine-
Russia gas disputes of  2005/06 and 2008/09, this 
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policy can be interpreted not only as geopolitical 
games of  the Kremlin, but as a strategy of  Gaz-
prom and the Ukrainian Naftogaz to win price 
concessions from one another. Both sides lost 
credibility in the process and have since learned to 
be more cautious if  they do not want to damage 
their relations with the EU.
Rather than view Gazprom’s 100-percent takeover 
of  the Belarusian company Beltransgas in 2011 
in purely geopolitical terms, one must consider 
other factors, particularly the economic fact that it 
secures transit routes to Gazprom’s most important 
market: Western Europe. The purchase of  pipe-
line networks in transit countries; the foundation 
of  a gas consortium in Ukraine for the pipeline 
system; establishing long-term contracts—all of  
these actions make sense from an economic point 
of  view, considering the high costs and the spe-
cific investment of  Gazprom in pipelines.21 At the 
same time, building new pipelines in the North and 
South of  Europe can also increase the security of  
supply for the EU and cements Gazprom’s depen-
dency on the European market. Another question 
is, whether all these pipelines will ever be economi-
cally viable and whether Gazprom’s investment is 
not economically risky, considering the changing 
global gas market and the extremely high costs 
for South Stream. This, however, is not a problem 
for the EU but rather for Gazprom itself  and the 
other pipeline shareholders. What is important is 
that the EU develops its policy not on the basis of  
one-dimensional security perceptions but based on 
facts and with an analysis of  the whole picture.
What then is the right policy for EU member 
states? They should do business with Russia as 
they have been doing with states like Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Qatar, and Nigeria: without overblown 
threat perceptions. It is necessary to diversify the 
mix of  resources; to increase security of  supply 
inside the EU through storages and interconnec-
tors; to implement a transparent, open, and com-
petitive energy market. The Third Energy Package 
is the right vehicle for pursuing this goal. Further-
more it makes sense for the EU member states to 
develop an anti-monopoly policy toward Russia 
and to use their leverage as the main consumer of  
Russian oil and gas to change Gazprom’s business 
concept. In September 2012 the European Com-
mission launched an anti-trust case against Gaz-
prom to ensure a genuine single market in gas.22 
The reaction in Russia has been an ongoing debate 
about how Gazprom should change its business 
model.23 Moreover, with Rosneft and Novatek, the 
emergence of  new players on the Russian gas mar-
ket may change the domestic gas market and bring 
new Russian players—competitors with Gazprom—
into European and Asian gas markets. It is there-
fore important for the EU to set the norms and 
regulations for the gas business on its territory and 
to ensure an open and competitive market. The 
grounds for EU policy should not be over-securi-
tized debates about the threat of  Gazprom but the 
desire to build up a functioning energy market that 
might include Gazprom and other Russian compa-
nies playing by international and EU rules.
Failure of the Common 
Neighborhood Policy
The common neighborhood of  the EU and Rus-
sia is a second key area of  tension. While the EU 
wants to import its norms to the Eastern Neigh-
borhood and integrate these countries in its market 
and value system, Russian elites understand the 
“near abroad” as its main area of  interest. Vladimir 
Putin started his third term as Russian president 
with a clear message: that Eurasian integration is 
the main focus of  his foreign policy.24 This prior-
ity can also be interpreted as a decision to distance 
Russia from Europe and to abandon the gradual 
Europeanization that had been the (rhetorical) 
paradigm during his two first terms as well as 
under Dmitri Medvedev’s presidency (2008–2012). 
Increasingly, the debate over European/Western 
influence on Russian/post-Soviet domestic poli-
tics—and, more generally, the divergent values of  
“Russia and the West”—plays out in the issue of  
the common neighborhood.
While Russia for a long time ignored the EU’s 
activities in the post-Soviet region, this changed 
with the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) policy, 
which was launched in May 2009. The policy was 
designed to increase the EU’s integration with six 
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direct post-Soviet neighbors—Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine—in areas 
like free trade and energy and to support admin-
istrative reforms and good governance, without 
offering the prospect of  EU membership.25 EU 
member states agreed to inaugurate the EaP espe-
cially as a result of  an increased perception of  inse-
curity in the Eastern Neighborhood resulting from 
the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 and the 
Ukrainian-Russian gas crisis of  winter 2008/09.26 
This policy did not involve Russia from the begin-
ning and was focused on enhancing the EU’s rela-
tions with the six EaP states (the bilateral platform) 
and—as an innovation—among them (the multi-
lateral platform).27 The EU’s increasing activities 
in the common neighborhood have pushed it into 
the role of  a competitor for Russia.28 The EU has 
opened the negotiation of  free trade and associa-
tion agreements with those EaP-states that are 
“willing and able to enter into a deeper engagement 
and gradual integration in the EU economy” and 
visa facilitation negotiations.29
The export of  EU norms and regulations to the 
common neighborhood challenges Russia’s role as 
the main political player in the region. In response, 
Russia has started to develop its own integration 
projects along similar lines, while integrating its 
neighbors in a Customs Union with Belarus and 
Kazakhstan in 2012 and a Eurasian Economic 
Union in 2015. In his 2011 article for the daily 
paper Izvestia, Putin declared that the Eurasian 
Economic Union seeks to implement EU-like 
integration while avoiding the EU’s mistakes.30 
What makes the Customs Union and the Eurasian 
Economic Union more relevant than previous insti-
tutions is the more consistent institutionalization, 
which has become apparent through the introduc-
tion of  common duties with respect to third coun-
tries and a common customs code. The Common 
Economic Space, which came into effect on Janu-
ary 1, 2012, will implement a liberalization agenda 
including the free movement of  labor and capital 
among the three states. It is still too early to assess 
these integration steps while Russia defers its politi-
cal ambitions and focuses on economic and trade 
rapprochement with two post-Soviet states; for the 
time being, however, it seems to be more success-
ful than all its past integration projects.
In Europe, the political and public discourse on the 
Eastern Neighborhood and especially on Ukraine 
has focused on a competition between integra-
tion with the EU or with Russia. This heats up the 
debate about different interests.31 More and more, 
the EU has accepted the rhetoric of  competition 
while at the same time being unwilling to invest 
sufficient resources into its policy. That means we 
observe a rhetoric of  competition between both 
sides while the EU is unable and unwilling to play 
its soft power toward the Eastern Neighborhood. 
“As a consequence, the EU has been locked into an 
integration competition with Russia over Eastern 
Europe, although it has been both unwilling and ill-
equipped to play this game.”32
Ukraine between Russia and the EU
In the last years, the EU’s main goal in the frame-
work of  its European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) 
and especially the EaP has been to develop Ukraine 
as the best practice example for integration while 
negotiating its ambitious Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). The change of  
the leadership in Ukraine after the 2010 presidential 
elections and the increasingly authoritarian policy 
of  President Victor Yanukovich have led to a shift 
in the EU’s debate and policy. In terms of  intro-
ducing political and economic reform, Ukraine’s 
success has been notably limited. While the EU 
and some member states tolerated these demo-
cratic shortcomings under the Orange coalition 
(2005–2010)—because of  the pluralistic political 
environment that prevailed at the time—they are 
now focused on introducing minimum standards 
of  democracy before signing the DCFTA. The 
EU has started a policy of  ultimatums to increase 
the democratic situation in the country. A domi-
nant discussion in the EU is that Brussels will sign 
the agreement if  the opposition politician Yulia 
Timoshenko is released from jail and some basic 
democratic principles are fulfilled. After Commis-
sioner Stefan Fülle’s meetings with high-ranking 
Ukrainian officials in Kiev in February 2013, a list 
of  19 democratic demands for signing the agree-
ment became public. They touch on areas like the 
election code, independence of  courts, and judicial 
reform.33 Commissioner Fülle has set a deadline for 
the Ukrainian government to implement reforms 
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for signing the agreement at the EaP summit in 
November 2013. 
A competing popular argument is that if  Ukraine’s 
EU-integration fails, Ukraine will come under Rus-
sian area of  influence.34 This line of  argument 
puts pressure on the EU because it challenges the 
democratization approach as a precondition for the 
DCFTA and questions the EU’s credibility. The 
main points of  focus for both discourses are Russia 
and Timoshenko—not how to integrate Ukraine in 
the EU or who the relevant partners in the country 
are. The EU lacks a clear political statement of  its 
interest in integrating Ukraine, and it lacks a policy 
that takes Ukrainian realities into consideration 
and would bring Ukraine closer to the EU. On one 
hand, the lack of  democracy in Ukraine is used as 
an excuse for the failure of  EU policy, while on 
the other hand it is argued that democratic reforms 
should be disregarded because of  the serious-
ness of  the Russia threat. At the same time the 
insistence on the release of  Yulia Timoshenko has 
brought EU-Ukraine relations into a dead end. It is 
important to analyze all three sides in the relation-
ship and follow a consistent approach, one that 
will help integrate Ukraine into the EU while at the 
same time not legitimizing the Ukrainian elites. 
For Russia, Ukraine is the second biggest country 
of  the post-Soviet region and is therefore key to 
all its integration projects. Russia’s main focus is 
therefore to push Ukraine into the Customs Union 
and prevent it from signing the DCFTA with the 
EU. In this context, Russia uses Ukraine’s depen-
dence on Russian gas supply to offer a discount 
on gas and the foundation of  a gas consortium in 
exchange for participation in the Customs Union. 
Ukraine could benefit from a lower gas price of  up 
to 8 billion dollars per annum.35 There are several 
statements by Russian officials that underline the 
benefits to the Ukrainian economy of  integrat-
ing with the Customs Union and that threaten the 
Ukraine would lose its important trade partner 
through sanctions, if  it signs the DCFTA with 
the EU.36 As economic analyses show, signing the 
DCFTA would bring comprehensive long-term 
and structural benefits for the Ukrainian economy 
compared to joining the Customs Union. It 
would decrease trade barriers, reduce corruption, 
and enhance competition and direct investment 
through improvement of  the regulation basis.37 At 
the same time, Russia’s WTO membership (since 
August 2012) and Ukraine’s (since May 2008) will 
reduce the possibilities of  Russia imposing sanc-
tions on Ukraine. Ukraine could use institutional 
mechanisms in the WTO context to address Rus-
sian sanctions.
The Mismatch between the EU and Ukraine
The EU mistakenly thinks Ukrainian elites have a 
main interest in signing the DCFTA. In fact, Yanu-
kovich’s policy is focused on maintaining power—
with or without the DCFTA. Ukrainian elites think 
like most post-Soviet elites: in the short term. 
This reality needs to be integrated into the EU’s 
strategy—and its understanding of  the Ukrainian 
political context. Firstly, Yanukovich is above all 
interested not in signing the DCFTA, but in secur-
ing his own power position and winning the 2015 
presidential elections. Secondly, for this he needs to 
sign a new gas contract with Russia, which will give 
him more financial leeway to implement popular 
measures before the presidential elections. Credit 
from the IMF is not an option because this would 
be linked with unpopular measures like increasing 
domestic gas prices, which would in turn diminish 
the president’s popularity. Thirdly, post-Soviet elites 
will never accept democratization as a prerequisite 
for smoother relations with the EU, because any 
democratic reform will challenge their power posi-
tion and economic privileges. None of  this bodes 
well for Ukrainian economic and political reform, 
but EU neighborhood policy must nonetheless take 
it into consideration.
The current Ukrainian government tries to use 
uncertainty about whether it will sign the DCFTA 
or integrate with the Customs Union in order to 
balance both sides. On the one hand, Yanukov-
ich has no interest in joining the Customs Union 
with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus; its benefits 
are limited and the costs would be high.38 The 
Ukrainian leadership is therefore lobbying for an 
observer position in the Customs Union. On the 
other hand, Yanukovich has not released Timosh-
enko; instead, he plays with the EU while at the 
same time fulfilling other demands, such as releas-
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ing the former minister of  internal affairs and close 
Timoshenko ally, Yuri Lutsenko. The EU is becom-
ing increasingly nervous that the trade agreement 
will not be signed, and that it will lose its momen-
tum—and credibility. By focusing on the DCFTA 
signature at the EaP summit in Vilnius at the end 
of  November 2013, it is sending contradictory 
messages to Ukraine.
Losing the Common Neighborhood
The perception that the EU will lose Ukraine to 
Russia is grounded in a wrong understanding of  
post-Soviet policy. The relationship between the 
post-Soviet states and Russia is not integration 
but balancing. No authoritarian (post-Soviet) state 
will give up sovereignty—especially not to Russia, 
the dominant player in the region. With regard to 
the Customs Union, this might change for some 
short-term economic benefits, but Kazakhstan and 
Belarus have put a stop to latest political integra-
tion dreams harbored by the Russian leadership.39
Russia’s own political, economic, and social model 
is not attractive to the societies of  these states. Rus-
sia’s Eurasian Union project can also be interpreted 
as the last of  the attempts to integrate post-Soviet 
states that have been floundering since the end of  
the Soviet Union. Observing the weaknesses of  the 
EU neighborhood policy as well as the EU’s finan-
cial and economic crisis, Moscow tries to integrate 
these states when the EU seems to be weak. That 
does not mean Russia is strong, or that conditions 
for integration have changed, but rather that Russia 
is simply trying to leverage the current weakness 
of  the EU to its own advantage. In terms of  soft 
power, the EU is still attractive, but it has to make 
a decision for more integration with post-Soviet 
states and to put more resources and commitment 
into the process. 
If  the EU genuinely wants greater integration with 
post-Soviet states, the discussion should not be 
about whether a (problematic) opposition leader 
like Timoshenko is freed from prison. Rather, it 
should be about how to implement DCFTA and 
the integration measures as well as about how to 
draw civil society into the process of  implementa-
tion. In the case of  Ukraine, this strategy is also 
relevant for the (still unpublished) “Fülle list,” 
which involves demands that are in the short term 
impossible for the Ukrainian government to fulfill 
because of  the existing gap between the written 
law and the ability to implement it. All of  these key 
issues have to be brought into focus in the DCFTA 
implementation process.40 Accepting the argument 
of  a competition with Russia over Ukraine, the EU 
accepts this paradigm without developing a serious 
policy that can challenge Russia’s approach. The 
EU has been offering economic benefits depending 
on the neighbors’ ability and willingness to imple-
ment the Union’s normative agenda. The EU is 
willing to give its neighbors influence only when 
they want to implement the Union’s demands, but 
it does not have a policy that clearly outlines how 
that is to be done.41
EU policy should be developed in line with its 
strengths, which are in institution building and 
implementing rules (even if  it also has weaknesses 
here, considering certain democratic deficits inside 
the EU itself). The EU should not be distracted by 
a geopolitical discussion about Russia but focus on 
how to implement its policy. In the case of  Ukraine, 
the DCFTA is a strong instrument; the focus of  
EU policy therefore should not be on finishing a 
process with the agreement’s signature but on start-
ing a process, which responds more effectively to 
the reality of  post-Soviet elites, in Ukraine and else-
where. Clear benchmarks in this process have to be 
built up, as well as sanctions that respond to regular 
review reports. Key partners for this review pro-
cess should be the Ukrainian civil society organiza-
tions, which are able to communicate to the public 
the successes and failures of  their government. To 
involve Ukrainian civil society in the implementa-
tion process of  the DCFTA would strengthen their 
position toward the political decision makers as 
well as to society as a whole.
If  the EU fails in this process, the main threat is 
not that these countries will be bound more closely 
into the Russian orbit but rather that a vacuum will 
grow in the common neighborhood that neither 
Russia nor the EU will be able to fill. Russia has 
no relevant modernization path to offer; it only 
imitates reforms and integration. In the end, both 
the EU and Russia have ended up in missing their 
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goals and being played off  one another by the 
countries between them. This becomes visible in 
the post-Soviet conflict zones in the Caucasus and 
Moldova, where a lack of  engagement from out-
side (i.e., by the EU) shows that Russia is neither 
willing nor able to play a positive role in conflict 
resolution or even conflict management. The frus-
tration about the disinterest of  their own elites and 
the lack of  real reform alternatives can increase 
the protest potential of  post-Soviet societies. As a 
result, the political and economic situation in the 
countries of  the common neighborhood is deterio-
rating, and social polarization is on the rise. 
The Visa Question as a  
Litmus Test for the EU
A third key topic in EU-Russia relations is the visa 
question. Russian government and society have 
a huge interest in visa facilitation and ultimately 
establishing visa-free travel. The main incentives for 
ENP and for deepening relations with Russia are 
to enhance economic and trade relations, mobility, 
and migration as well as to improve regional and 
financial cooperation. If  the EU wants to promote 
democracy, rule of  law, and good governance in 
Russia it needs to promote greater exchange with 
Russian society. In the long term, only Russians 
themselves can change Russian politics from within, 
and if  the EU wants to be a partner in this process, 
it needs to support the empowerment of  Russian 
society. Visa liberalization is a key element of  this 
process, with visa abolition as the final goal. But 
for the EaP states as well as for Russia, visa liberal-
ization is a long-term goal that will be provided for 
individual countries on a case-by-case basis. For a 
long time, domestic politicians of  some EU mem-
ber states dominated the debate with a focus on 
the “invasion” of  poor migrants, illegal immigra-
tion, and organized crime. The failure to liberalize 
visas is a main factor undermining the EU’s cred-
ibility in Russia and the EaP countries, especially 
in broader society. The EU’s policy in this area 
increases the gap between EU and societies to the 
East.42 Instead of  enhancing exchange and demon-
strating more openness, many EU member states 
reinforce the existing status quo.
While some EU member states have for a long 
time blocked visa negotiations with Russia, the 
constant lobbying of  companies and civil society 
organizations has managed to shift the position 
of  many states, including Germany.43 The main 
arguments for more visa freedom are that increas-
ing exchange between societies will improve social 
and economic relations and strengthen the EU’s 
soft power. The Committee on Eastern European 
Economic Relations, in coordination with other 
European economic confederations, quantifies the 
financial burden of  visa regulations for European 
countries as amounting to several hundreds of  mil-
lion Euros per year.44 More social exchange would, 
moreover, ultimately support political change in 
Russia and other post-Soviet countries. On the 
official Russian side, the difficulty obtaining visas 
has always been cited as example in the argument 
that the EU has no genuine interest in open bor-
ders and social exchange. At the same time, it was 
important for the government to be able to give 
members of  their bureaucratic apparatus as well 
as private and state entrepreneurs the possibil-
ity of  traveling and doing business abroad. In the 
past, this was part of  the Putin’s system contract 
with the Russian elite: no political engagement in 
exchange for travel and the possibility of  doing 
business and holding property abroad.
Since March 2012, with Putin’s third presiden-
tial term, there has been a shift in Russian policy 
toward the elite. One policy currently being 
debated in the Russian leadership is the introduc-
tion of  a special number of  visa-free service pass-
ports available to an unspecified circle of  people. 
Moscow has linked visa freedom for service 
passports with visa ease for other special groups. 
A high number of  service passports without visa 
restrictions would strengthen Putin’s power posi-
tion. The Kremlin’s goal is to control who gets 
these passports—without transparency toward the 
EU. This is part of  the Russian leadership’s rena-
tionalization policy, in which the government has 
used a campaign against corruption and private 
property of  state officials to bring Russian bureau-
crats under control.45 The visa freedom for ser-
vice passports by decision of  the Kremlin would 
become an instrument to reward loyalty—and 
sanction disloyalty. Visa freedom for all Russian cit-
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izens is rather less in the interest of  the ruling elite, 
because it would give more freedom to the people. 
For its part, the EU’s main interest is to increase 
exchange with Russian society. In the EU, the 
debate is based either on making compromises 
with the Russian side or getting something in 
return for visa ease. From a EU perspective, all 
people are equal, and it should not accept prefer-
ence for officials over the rest of  society. Steps 
for visa freedom for all groups should therefore 
proceed simultaneously. By now it would be much 
easier in the framework of  the existing visa rules 
to give more and longer visas to Russian citizens; 
some member states like Finland are already 
doing that. This cannot replace the symbolic (and 
real) importance of  a visa-facilitation agreement 
between Russia and the EU and the relevance of  
visa freedom, but it would send an important signal 
to Russian society and the business community—to 
show that EU has no problems with more Russians 
traveling to the EU member states.
EU-Russia Relations:  
Is the Ball on the EU’s Side?
The simplified understanding of  what is going on 
in Russia and how to understand Russian foreign 
policy is a main hindrance of  EU’s Russia policy. 
Russia is much more complex, diverse, and plu-
ralistic than the dominant public discourse within 
EU member states allows. It is not only about an 
authoritarian Putin system that violates the human 
and democratic rights of  its citizens, but is also 
about a society that is skeptical both of  its own 
politicians and of  Western influence. At the same 
time, Russian society is in a process of  change. A 
growing portion of  citizens no longer accepts the 
Putin contract of  being apolitical in exchange for 
consumption incentives. It wants to participate in 
the political sphere—or at least to be able to criti-
cize the state’s failure in the public sector in their 
city or region.46 Russians do not see the main tasks 
of  their leadership in strengthening Russia’s role in 
the world or weakening conflicts among nationali-
ties but instead in supporting economic growth 
and the fight against corruption. Corruption in the 
education and health system is of  much greater 
concern to the people than external threats.47 For 
more and more people, the lack of  public services 
and the increasing dysfunction of  infrastructure at 
the regional and municipal level are the reason for 
civic engagement and voicing criticism.
Many EU member states see Russia the way they 
want to see it. German political elites are frustrated 
by Putin’s return for a third term and by the coun-
try’s lack of  democratization.48 Central eastern 
governments feel vindicated that the Putin regime 
is what it has always been: authoritarian and indif-
ferent to modernization. But the expectations of  
how Russia should change are often unrealistic. 
While EU member states have in fact very limited 
influence on Russian domestic policy, they can 
change the direction and capability of  EU policy. 
EU member states need to clarify what is in their 
interest in cooperation with Russia. They must 
rethink what is possible. The EU has the instru-
ments to engage with Russia and to influence some 
developments. Even if  there is a strong resistance 
by the current Russian leadership with regard to 
cooperation and compromises, the EU member 
states can do more. The economic and social inter-
dependence of  the EU and Russia is a strong tool 
for engagement. The EU and its member states 
should not invest less interest and resources in their 
relations with Russia because of  Putin’s return but 
rather engage Russian society and its different elites 
in a broader way. It must, in short, use its instru-
ments more intelligently and confidently.
Firstly, the EU should not accept Russian rules for 
the relationship but set and enforce its own rules. 
This should be the case with energy policy as well 
as visa policy. Gazprom wants to enforce long-term 
contracts and secure its transport monopoly. That 
is its legitimate interest, but EU does not have to 
accept it. Gazprom is dependent on the EU energy 
market in terms of  revenues and infrastructure. 
There is a discussion in Russia about splitting Gaz-
prom in reaction to the EU’s Third Energy Package 
and the European Commission’s anti-trust case. 
While implementing these principles, the EU sets 
clear conditions on its energy market and intro-
duces transparency and competition. If  Gazprom 
will not accept this, it will lose market share. At the 
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same time, division of  Gazprom and the loss of  
export monopoly would in fact have positive effects 
for the Russian energy market. It would increase 
competition in the domestic market and as well as 
outside the country. The result would be falling gas 
prices and requirements for more efficient manage-
ment. This could influence the role of  the state in 
Gazprom and in the whole energy sector. 
In the case of  the visa negotiations, EU member 
states have to understand and communicate to 
their own societies that visa ease—or visa-free 
conditions—within the common neighborhood 
would bring benefits in terms of  enhancing eco-
nomic cooperation, promoting social change, and 
increasing the EU’s attractiveness and security in 
the neighborhood. However, to accept Russian 
rules by compromising on service passports, as 
the Russian government wants, would undermine 
the EU’s credibility in Russian society as a whole, 
and increase the gap between normal citizens and 
those in power. It is important that the EU side 
controls who gets visa freedom and how. To give 
this instrument to the Russian government would 
legitimize its opaque and corrupt ways of  address-
ing the question. The visa issue is critical because it 
sends an important signal that the EU is interested 
in increasing exchange with Russian society. It is 
also as helpful for civil society exchange as it is for 
economic relations. We should not underestimate 
the importance of  the fact that outside recognition 
(i.e., by the EU) of  policies and rules created by 
post-Soviet elites is a main source for these govern-
ments’ domestic legitimacy.
Secondly, the EU should use and enforce existing 
instruments in a less ideological but more prag-
matic way. The member states and the Commission 
should not concentrate their policy on democratiz-
ing post-Soviet countries from outside—i.e., by 
signing agreements—but on the implementation 
process of  the contracts and involving society. 
Post-Soviet elites have no interest in political 
change because this would challenge their power 
positions and privileges. They do need foreign 
investments, however, along with market access, 
technology transfer, and consumer imports. Taking 
EU-EaP relations—and relations with Ukraine in 
particular—as examples, the focus should be on 
implementing the DCFTA rather than on simply 
signing an agreement with a democratic govern-
ment. It is unrealistic to wait until post-Soviet elites 
have democratized themselves (as a result of  the 
offer of  deeper economic integration and sign-
ing an association agreement). Until a sustainable 
economic and political system can be established, 
post-Soviet elites need certain openness to other 
markets but have at the same time an interest in 
shielding internal politics from outside influence. 
Thirdly, the EU should learn from its failures in 
the countries affected by the so-called Arab Spring 
and refocus its policy on potential partners within 
the elite and society at large—but not, first of  all, 
on stabilizing the ruling elite. This is not a plea for 
completely redirecting the EU’s policy toward civil 
society but rather an argument for a more balanced 
approach between maintaining professional rela-
tions with the ruling elites and identifying possible 
partners for long-term change. These partners are 
not primarily the very small group of  pro-Western 
civil society actors but rather small- and medium-
sized entrepreneurs, all of  whom belong to civil 
society and agree in universal democratic principles 
and, finally, the more open and liberal part of  the 
elite. To learn about the interests and needs of  dif-
ferent parts or groups of  society, to build up plat-
forms for communication with these groups and 
with elite are important tasks for better understand-
ing developments in Russia and the post-Soviet 
states. Communication and change is not a one-way 
street leading from Europe to Russia but rather a 
two-way process in which societies learn from each 
other. Abolishing, or at least facilitating, visas and 
promoting exchange programs on different levels 
are preconditions for improving our understanding 
of  Russia—and our Russia policy. Only a deeper 
knowledge about the relations between society and 
power in Russia and especially in Russian regions 
can help to develop a more effective Eastern policy 
of  the EU.
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